ISSN 0024-7081
Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2010January 01, 2010 CDT
ccby-4.0
Designing Better Institutions to Enforce Competition Law: A Symposium Introduction
Designing Better Institutions to Enforce Competition Law: A Symposium Introduction
Articles in Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2010
Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2010
- Table of ContentsJournal Loyola University Chicago Law
- Designing Better Institutions to Enforce Competition Law: A Symposium IntroductionSpencer Weber Waller
- When the Going Get Tight: Institutional Solutions when Antitrust Enforcement Resources are ScarceMichal S. Gal
- Stranger in a Strange Land: An Outsider's View of Antitrust and the CourtsNeil Komesar
- Designing Competition Law Institutions: Values, Structure, and MandateMichael J. TrebilcockEdward M. Iacobucci
- Antitrust and Institutions: Design and ChangeEleanor M. Fox
- A Model of Antitrust Regulatory StrategyAllan Fels
- Reforming the Enforcement of the Japanese Antimonopoly LawMitsuo Matsushita
- The Institutional Design of Canadian Competition Law: The Evolving Role of the CommissionerCalvin S. GoldmanNavin Joneja
- Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from Restaurant GuidesD. Daniel Sokol
- The (Un)Constitutionality of Section 632 of the Edge Act: An Analysis under Article III and Theories of Protective JurisdictionElizabeth R. Sheyn
- The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American ExperienceEdward D. Cavanagh
Spencer Weber Waller, Designing Better Institutions to Enforce Competition Law: A Symposium Introduction, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 411 (2010).